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Abstract:  Crime policy is subject to the policy process just like other 
governmental policies.  An effective crime policy is one that reduces the amount of 
crime in a police department’s jurisdiction, e.g., the city.  Accordingly, crime 
policy consists of the same policy components – agenda setting, formulation, 
implementation, and feedback.  The implementation of any crime policy depends 
on the information collected by police departments, often through crimes reported 
to the department via 9-1-1 calls or brought to a police officer’s attention through 
proactive police work.  The success of that police work relative to the reported 
crime first depends on whether the type of crime is recorded correctly so that 
investigative follow-up, if necessary, can be conducted efficiently and properly.  
Accordingly, police departments that have appropriate internal controls to assess 
the quality of their crime recording efforts can provide relevant feedback to the 
command staff and political leaders responsible for setting the agenda and 
reformulating policy when necessary.  This paper will examine the Atlanta Police 
Department’s efforts in improving its crime recording procedures in 2002-2003 
and the changes that led to sustained crime reductions following 2002. 
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Crime Policy 
At its basic level, crime policy can be defined as those governmental laws and rules created to 
respond to and reduce the amount of crime in a jurisdiction.  Persons who violate the criminal 
law are subject to arrest by police, prosecution by the local district attorney’s office, and 
incarceration in the local jail or state prison.  The three former organizations compose the 
criminal justice “system.”  
 
The criminal justice system exists to deal with those who commit crimes – the police response to 
them and the punitive measures for addressing the offenders – and there exists differences of 
opinion on how to best address and limit the number of incidences in which people are 
victimized.  On one side of the policy argument, at its broadest level, putting convicted criminals 
in jail and thus removing them from society ought to be a sufficient deterrent to committing 
crime.  On the other side, again at its broadest level, crime can be prevented by improving the 
socio-economic standing of individuals such that committing crimes will be viewed as a negative 
option.  Regardless which direction is chosen, the policymaking starts with the same premise of 
what works best to control crime. 
  
Reducing or limiting crime is one function of the criminal justice system that falls in part to the 
police department.  And as recent evidence suggests, police departments have become more 
effective and efficient and doing just that.  According to the FBI’s Crime in the United States, 
total crime in the United States as measured by the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting System 
(UCR) has been generally falling since 2000, and especially in the last three years (FBI, 2010).  
This has led researchers to question what exactly is driving the crime decline – changes in 
policing or changes in other sociological variables.  Unfortunately, research into this question 




Crime in Atlanta 
One such city that has experienced dramatic decreases in crime is the city of Atlanta, Georgia.  
Atlanta, a city that has prided itself on being the face of the “new South,” had a reputation for 
violence for a long time.  In 2000, 2001 and 2002, according to FBI comparative data, Atlanta 
was the most violent city in America.  The aggregate rate of murder, rape, robbery, and 
aggravated assault was 7.8 percent higher than the second most violent city during the same 
period, St. Louis, and 462.8 percent higher than the average of the 237 cities in the nation with a 
population over 100,000.
2
  In fact, crime in Atlanta had reached its highest in 1996 and despite 
decreasing 29.6 percent by 2002, Atlanta had ranked among the top three cities for worst overall 
crime rate in cities with a population of 100,000 or more during this entire period.  For 
comparison purposes, the corresponding violent crime ranking is also included for each of these 
years. 
  
                                                          
1
 Johnson, Golub and Dunlap, 2000; Eck and Maguire, 2000; Karmen, 2000; Unter, 2009 
2
 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the United States, 2000-2002. 
2
Georgia Journal of Public Policy, Vol. 1 [2011], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/gjpp/vol1/iss1/2
Unter |  Proper Crime Recording as an Effective Feedback Tool in Articulating a Crime Policy  |  3 
 
TABLE 1 
Atlanta Crime Rankings, 1996-2002 








1996 70,251 17,001.2 1 3 
1997 58,591 13,921.6 1 2 
1998 58,129 14,031.9 2 2 
1999 55,477 13,488.5 3 2 
2000 55,468 13,135.8 2 1 
2001 52,195 12,237.7 3 1 
2002 49,451 11,355.2 2 1 
Source: FBI, Crime in the United States, 1996-2002. 
 
In addition to ranking as the most violent city in America, Atlanta also ranked at or near the top 








 worst rape rate, 92 percent higher than the national average (it was well-













 worst property crime rate (the combination of burglary, larceny-theft, and auto 












 worst auto theft rate, 284 percent higher than the national average. 
 
In 2001, former New Orleans Police Department Superintendent Richard J. Pennington took 
command as the new Chief of Police of the Atlanta Police Department.  Chief Pennington 
resolved to cut Atlanta’s crime rates rapidly and dramatically.  Towards that end, he initiated 
COBRA (Command Operations Briefings to Revitalize Atlanta) meetings modeled off of 
COMSTAT, the crime fighting process he successfully deployed in New Orleans to improve 
crime intelligence and exact accountability through its police department.
4
 One component of the 
COBRA system’s successful implementation is accurate data as manifested through feedback to 
the organization. 
                                                          
3
 “Chief starts Inquiry on procedures in sex cases,” Atlanta Journal Constitution, 12/3/02 
4
 It should be noted that COMSTAT was based off the Compstat system created by the New York Police 
Department in 1994. 
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Accurate Crime Reporting as Feedback to Guide Implementation 
When concepts are envisioned as a “system,” especially within political science, it automatically 
brings to mind Easton’s systems theory (1953) that relates such systems as part of a policy 
process.  Kingdon (1984) expounds on this policy process further by conceiving it as cyclical in 
nature.  That is, the process starts with policy formulation; once formulated, the policy is 
adopted; once adopted, the policy is implemented; once implemented, the policy is evaluated for 
impact; once evaluated, this information is “fed back” to policy makers to formulate 
improvements to the existing policy.  Ideally, this process involves all political actors – including 
police officers – and perhaps most importantly, gives due credit to police officers as the policy 
implementers, with discretion and latitude in their performance.  
 
The utilization of such a heuristic allows for detailed examination of crime policy, especially 
changes in the policy itself.  As stated by Scheingold, “what is true of policy in general is likely 
to be particularly true of crime control policies” (1991, 5).  The vagaries of street crime 
necessitate immediate assessment and follow-up of police performance, among other political 
actors.  When police performance is unsatisfactory or ineffective, crime can increase and the 
need for change manifested via public outcry can become more intense. 
 
Much of the work done by a police department is the result of citizens reporting the crime, either 
currently occurring or having occurred, to the police via the 9-1-1 emergency system.  These are 
coded via the Computer-Aided Dispatch (CAD) system as “calls for service” or CFS.  A much 
smaller percentage of the crime reported is either observed by the police officers themselves or 
when a citizen sees an officer and reports the crime directly to the officer.   
 
In the former situation, the emergency operator receives the emergency call and assigns the 
incident both an incident number and a crime code based on the type of call.  This crime code, 
dictated by the police department and in accordance with state law, is based primarily on the 
information presented to the dispatcher by the emergency call.  This information gives the 
responding officer an understanding of what situation he will face upon arrival at the potential 
crime scene. In the latter, the officer will record the crime code on the incident report directly.  
Once the officer reports the crime to dispatch, the dispatcher will assign an incident number for 
the officer. 
Upon arrival at the crime scene, several options are available to an officer depending on the 
situation: if there is clear evidence that a crime has occurred, the officer will indicate to dispatch 
that an incident or crime report is being completed, such as “report to follow” or RTF; if there is 
no evidence that a crime has occurred, the officer will indicate to dispatch that the call was 
“unfounded” or UNF.  However, there are two other options available to the responding officer 
depending on the situation: the officer may indicate to dispatch that the offenders were “gone on 
arrival” or GOA; or that the officer took care of the situation without effectuating an arrest, or 
“necessary action taken” or NAT.  An example of an officer responding with the code GOA 
would be a 9-1-1 call of someone dealing drugs in a visible location but leaves before the officer 
arrives.  An example of an officer responding with the code NAT would be an officer responding 
to a low-level disturbance or fight and getting the offenders to disperse without having to arrest 
anybody.  Regardless of how the officer responds, the incident is coded into the police 
department’s record management system, or RMS. 
4
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In addition, based on the evidence available to the officer when he responds to the scene, the 
officer also has the ability to reclassify the original crime code assigned by the emergency 
dispatcher.  For example, a woman sexually attacked could be initially coded as a Rape by the 
dispatcher only to have the responding officer investigate and reclassify the crime as an Indecent 
Assault; property stolen from a person could be initially coded as a Robbery by the dispatcher 
but recoded as a Purse Snatching or Shoplifting; property stolen from inside a structure could be 
initially coded as a Burglary only to be recoded as a Theft; damage to a window or door of a 
vehicle could initially be coded as an Attempted Theft, but recoded as Vandalism.  This is 
because each crime has a series of lesser crimes beneath it depending on the elements of the 
crime that are met. 
 
The above description serves two purposes for this discussion – it highlights how much 
discretion police have in coding a crime reported to them based on the evidence available and it 
also dictates what additional investigative efforts will be undertaken by the police department to 
solve the crime.  This latter point is extremely important as any attempt to implement an 
articulated crime policy – any attempt to make that policy effective – is completely dependent on 
the accuracy of the information on which implementation decisions are being made. 
 
Crime Reporting 
The above-referenced crime reports are then categorized according to crime type and then 
summed to reflect the amount of crime in the jurisdiction.  The primary repository for capturing 
these statistics is the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting system, or UCRs.  The FBI’s Uniform 
Crime Reports were invented by the International Association of the Chiefs of Police (IACP) in 
1929.  Although technically there are eight categories that compose Part I crimes (arson was 
added in 1979), the seven original categories and their definitions are (Department of Justice 
1995): 
 
 Murder and non-negligent manslaughter – the willful (i.e. non-negligent) killing of 
one human being by another (traffic fatalities are excluded). 
 
 Forcible rape – the carnal knowledge of a female forcibly and against her will. Rapes 
by force and attempts or assaults to rape regardless of the age of the victim are 
included (statutory offenses, or rape where no force was used, i.e. the victim was 
under the age of consent, are excluded). 
 
 Robbery – the taking or attempting to take anything of value from the care, custody, 
or control of a person or persons by force or threat of force or violence and/or by 
putting the victim in fear. 
 
 Aggravated assault (aggravated battery in most jurisdictions) – an unlawful attack by 
one person upon another for the purpose of inflicting severe or aggravated bodily 
injury.  This type of assault usually is accompanied by the use of a weapon or by 
means likely to produce death or great bodily harm (simple assaults are excluded). 
 
5
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 Burglary – the unlawful entry of a structure to commit a felony or theft (attempted 
forcible entry is included). 
 
 Larceny-theft (except motor vehicle theft) – the unlawful taking, carrying, leading, or 
riding away of property from the possession or constructive possession of another.  
Examples are thefts of bicycles or automobile accessories, shoplifting, pocket-
picking, or the stealing of any property or article which is not taken by force and 
violence or by fraud.  Attempted larcenies are included; embezzlement, confidence 





 Motor vehicle theft – the theft or attempted theft of a motor vehicle.  A motor vehicle 
is self-propelled and runs on the surface and not on rails (motorboats, construction 
equipment, airplanes, and farming equipment are specifically excluded from this 
category. 
 
The totals for each of the first four crime categories are summed to compose the Violent Crime 
Index; the totals for each of the last three crime categories are summed to compose the Property 
Crime Index.  The UCR data is compiled from monthly law enforcement reports or individual 
crime incident reports transmitted directly to the FBI or to centralized state agencies that then 
report to the FBI.  The UCR Program then provides crime counts for the nation as a whole, as 
well as for regions, states, counties, cities and towns.  This allows for studies of various 
comparisons – among neighboring jurisdictions and among those with similar populations 
throughout the country, and other common characteristics.  The UCR Program represents over 
96 percent of the total population of the United States (Department of Justice 1995). 
It is important to note that the UCR program only counts those offenses “known to law 
enforcement.”  This means incidents and occurrences that are brought to the attention of the 
police by victims, witnesses, or by direct observations by police officers themselves as discussed 
earlier.  As such, they represent the “official” level of crime in a community (Stephens 1999).  
Also, other offenses that citizens consider “serious” or cares deeply about are not counted, such 
as narcotics offenses or other vice crimes. 
 
This is not the only problem with using UCR data.  Although the UCR program captures those 
crimes reported to police, it does have a unique crime classifying and scoring procedure that can 
artificially deflate the actual number of crimes committed and reported to police.  This occurs 
when multiple crimes are committed simultaneously (FBI 1984).  Under this “hierarchy rule” 
only the highest or most serious offense is counted.  For example, assume that during the 
commission of an armed robbery of a commercial eatery the offender strikes an employee with 
the gun; after the robbery the offender runs from the eatery and steals an automobile at the curb 
for a getaway vehicle.  By law, three Part I UCR crimes have been committed – robbery, 
                                                          
5
 The FBI does not provide a clear reason as to why certain crimes are classified Part I and others Part II other than 
this blanket statement: “The Part II Offenses encompass all other crime classifications outside those defined as Part I 
[earlier in this publication].  In November, 1932, the UCR Program adopted a Standard Classification of Offenses 
for the compilation of criminal statistics.  This classification was devised and adopted in order that law enforcement, 
judicial, and penal statistics might be uniformly compiled in terms of a single classification of offenses” (FBI 1984, 
79). 
6
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aggravated assault and auto theft – but on the UCR report only the robbery will be counted 
because it is the most serious crime.  This is not to say that the other two crimes will not be 
counted by the local police department nor will the perpetrator not be charged by the district 
attorney’s office for those crimes; the hierarchy rule counts only the most serious crime in a 
multiple offense situation.  As stated by the Department of Justice, the primary reason for the 
hierarchy rule is to “prevent the double-counting of crime” (Maltz 1999, 14). The hierarchy rule 
also allows for direct comparison across jurisdictions by putting crime rates onto the same 
classification scale.   
 
The hierarchy rule and classification scheme can also lead to a final problem noted with using 
UCR data.  Crimes are reported to the police who classify them, score them, tabulate them, and 
send them to the state or directly to the UCR program.  This can provide the opportunity for 
intentional manipulation of the statistics themselves, or “downgrading,” to make the city appear 
safer than it really is.  As Stephens notes, in some cases “the careers of police chiefs and sheriffs 
have been affected in either positive or negative ways by these statistics” (1999, 56).  
Downgrading occurs when police classify the crime that is reported to them as a Part II UCR 
crime, or a less severe crime, instead of the proper Part I UCR crime.   
 
These two purposes are important relative to the crime policy process.  The measure of public 
safety – and the effectiveness of any crime policy – continues to be based on whether crime is up 
or down, with the adequacy or effectiveness of police performance inversely related to that 
measure: if crime is down, then the police are thought to be doing a good job and vice-versa 
(Brady 1996).  Indeed, the presence or absence of crime is the occupational standard against 
which police programs are measured (Trojanowicz et al 1998).  Thus, the impression is formed 
in the public’s mind that it is the police officers who are responsible for reducing crime.  In fact, 
the police are perhaps the only actors in the criminal justice system whose performance can be 
measured so simply by the public (underscoring these perceptions are the ever-present television 
shows in which the perpetrators are caught through good police work and the public is spared 
any future menace, conveniently all within a one-hour time frame.) 
 
Thus the accuracy of crime reporting serves as the feedback loop inherent to effective 
implementation in the crime policy process.  Inaccurate coding of crime, for whatever reason, 
will give police executives improper understanding of the total amount of crime in their 
jurisdiction and thus affect changes to existing policy.  If the problem is sufficient enough it can 
result in incorrect shifts in crime strategies or not implementing needed crime strategies 
altogether.  Accordingly, it is incumbent on police executives and those responsible for 
formulating crime policy and strategies to have as accurate as information as possible regarding 
the crime occurrences in their jurisdiction to ensure the city’s residents are as safe as possible.  
One such way of doing just that is to regularly audit their crime reporting and recording 
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The Need for an Audit to Ensure Accuracy 
Since COBRA’s successful implementation was dependent on accurate crime data – and 
progress in reducing crime can be gauged only against a reliable crime data benchmark – Chief 
Pennington in mid-2003 also authorized an audit of crime reports and other crime records for 
2002, the most recent full year.  The purposes of the audit were: 
 
 to assess the quality of criminal incident reports with respect to their conformance 
with the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) rules and regulations in both 
classifying incidents and in clearing cases;  
 
 to determine whether the number of Part I crimes reported by the APD to the FBI for 
the year 2002 was truly indicative of the number of Part I crimes reported by citizens 
of Atlanta to the APD; and  
 
 to recommend changes, if warranted, that would eliminate the need for audits of this 
type in the future. 
 
At Chief Pennington’s request and under the direction of an outside auditor, the APD audited a 
random sample of crime reports from five of the seven Part I UCR categories
6
 and from selected 
Part II UCR categories
7
 utilizing methods recommended by the FBI for reviewing and auditing 
criminal incident reports.  The audit was ordered to ascertain two things: first, whether a criminal 
incident report is being correctly coded based upon the information that is contained in the 
report; and second, whether the criminal incident report truly reflects what the complainant 
stated or believes to have occurred (i.e. is it a true record of the crime reported to have occurred).  
If a report contains inaccurate information or is incomplete, an accurate crime classification 
becomes impossible.  Incomplete reports that lack critical information also affect the 




In 2002, the APD processed over 100,000 incident reports.  Using methodology recommended 
by the FBI,
8
 2,332 incident reports with a UCR Part I crime index classification were reviewed, 
and 2,728 UCR Part II classified reports were reviewed.  A random sample of 451 complainants 
was then re-interviewed, via telephone, to further assess the completeness of the incident report 
and its accuracy.  Those chosen for a call-back were selected from reports determined to be 
correctly completed and classified to verify their accuracy i.e., to determine whether or not the 
                                                          
6
 Murder reports, Rape reports, and Domestic Violence reports already classified as Part I crimes were not reviewed 
because of the sensitive nature of the crime.   
7
 UCR Part II index offenses are criminal offenses other those classified as t Part I detailed in the beginning of this 
Chapter.  Crimes such as Malicious Destruction of Property, Simple Assault, Vandalism, etc. account for Part II 
offenses. 
8
 All findings using the FBI’s Klaus formula for statistical reliability are at the 95 percent confidence level, the 
minimum level of confidence allowed. 
8
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police officer captured all of the relevant crime information as reported by the complainant.  
Using statistical sampling methods provided by the FBI, the total number of reports found to be 
incorrectly classified was projected for all of 2002. 
 
The projected results of the audit revealed that 3,337 crime reports that should have been coded 
as Part I were not coded as such.  In addition, 1,767 reports coded as Part I should not have been.  
After proper reclassification, this yielded a net increase of 1,570 Part I crime reports.  In all, for 
2002, UCR Part I crime – the FBI’s nationally accepted measure of crime – was underreported in 
Atlanta by 3.2 percent. Table 2 shows the increases in Part I UCR crime by category for 2002. 
 
TABLE 2 







Murder 152 152 0 
Rape 276 325 + 17.8% 
Robbery 4,168 4,251 + 2.0% 
Aggravated Assault 5,373 5,915 + 10.1% 
Violent Crime Totals 9,969 10,643 +6.8% 
Burglary 8,554 9,637 +12.7% 
Larceny-Theft 23,706 23,667 - 0.2% 
Auto Theft 7,222 7,074 - 2.0% 
Property Crime Totals 39,482 40,378 +2.3% 




While conducting the audit, numerous incident reports could not be accounted for in the APD’s 
Record Management System (RMS).  In these instances, the system reported that an officer had 
responded to the 9-1-1 call and had transmitted a “Code 17” to the dispatcher, indicating that an 
incident report would be forthcoming.  A review comparing “Code 17” dispatch code records 
with reports existing in the system identified 22,256 incident reports that were unaccounted for – 
incident reports that APD officers had said were written but in fact could not be located.  Despite 
attempts to locate these missing incident reports, the APD could not produce any copies and 
could not provide any explanation as to why the reports could not be found. 
 
Despite not having the reports, the auditor reviewed the 22,256 original dispatch codes – the 
code which is transmitted by the dispatcher to the responding officer that indicates the nature of 
the call – and determined that 13,005 of these dispatched calls were likely to be criminal 
incidents based on the dispatch code.  Of these, 4,281 may have been UCR Part I crimes.   
 
9
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Again, it should be noted, however, that the final crime classification assigned to an incident may 
be entirely different from the initial dispatch code, and in some instances may not be a crime at 
all.  The fact remains, however, that the APD could not locate the corresponding incident reports 
for 22,256 calls to 9-1-1 in which the officer indicated to the dispatcher that an incident report 
was generated as a result of the call. 
 
9-1-1 Calls Reporting a Crime, But No Reports Filed 
The audit also randomly sampled calls to 9-1-1 that resulted in an officer being dispatched and 
ultimately reporting back to the dispatcher that no incident report was required.  There were 
229,445 of these records in the APD’s 2002 Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) database out of 
808,687 total calls.  Again, using the methodology recommended by the FBI, a random sample 
of calls to 9-1-1 of this type was selected according to the initial dispatch code.  Using the 
information contained in the CAD database, and following the FBI’s accepted statistical 
practices, 384 successful calls were placed to the original 9-1-1 caller who was asked to describe 
the reason why the original 9-1-1 call was made.  In the callbacks, it was determined whether a 
crime may have occurred based on the information described.  Based on the results of callbacks 
that indicated that an incident might have occurred, extrapolations were made as to the number 
of criminal incidents that were not recorded and investigated by the APD.  Based on this 
projection, the audit estimates that an additional 38,760 incidents occurred that should have been 
documented by the APD in 2002 were not.  Based on the initial dispatch code and the 
information provided via the callback, it was further estimated that 17,670 of these calls to 9-1-1 
could be classified as UCR Part I crimes. 
 
9-1-1 Calls Forwarded to Teleserve 
Teleserve is a small unit within the APD’s Communications Unit that is responsible for handling 
calls rerouted from 9-1-1 and taking incident reports over the phone for minor crimes and other 
incidents in lieu of dispatching an officer to the scene.
9
    If a caller to 9-1-1 is reporting such an 
incident, the 9-1-1 dispatcher forwards the call to the Teleserve operators who then handle the 
call.  As a subsection of the crime report audit, the auditors identified more than 52,000 incidents 
assigned to Teleserve in 2002. 
 
Based on the initial review of these more than 52,000 incidents, the auditors discovered that this 
number was over-representative of the total number of incidents handled by the Teleserve Unit.  
The audit revealed that there has been no consistent tracking of incidents that are assigned to the 
Unit, and in many instances, multiple incident numbers were assigned by this Unit to a single 
incident.  Teleserve used manual logs to track call histories and reports taken, making the 
recreation of the Unit’s activity for 2002 too labor intensive to undertake. 
                                                          
9
 In 2003 at the time of the audit, Teleserve handles the following calls according to Department guidelines:  most 
larcenies including larceny from auto and larceny of auto accessories, lost or stolen checks and credit cards, lost 
property, abandoned vehicles, harassing, obscene, or threatening phone calls, indecent exposures where the suspect 
is not on the scene and the time lapse is over one hour, vandalism, and other supplemental reports (example: 
additional stolen property). 
10
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As a result of the inconsistencies in Teleserve's record keeping, no accepted scientific methods 
could be applied to the audit of Teleserve’s activity, and therefore, no reliable extrapolation of 
underreporting could be made.  But there is certainty that hundreds, perhaps thousands, of Part I 
UCR incidents were not recorded by Teleserve and, therefore, investigated by the APD. 
 
Crime Captured by Other Agencies Not Reported to the APD 
There are 15 other law enforcement agencies with jurisdiction in the City of Atlanta that also 
respond to crimes and issue criminal incident reports.  These agencies are:  
 Clark-Atlanta University Police Department, 
 DeKalb County Police Department, 
 Fulton County Marshall’s Office, 
 Fulton County Police Department, 
 Fulton County Sheriff’s Department, 
 Georgia State Capitol Police, 
 Georgia State Troopers, 
 Georgia Bureau of Investigations, 
 Georgia State University Police Department, 
 Georgia Technical Institute Police Department, 
 Georgia World Congress Center Police Department, 
 MARTA Police Department, 
 Morehouse College Police Department, 
 Morris Brown College Police Department, and 
 Spelman College Police Department. 
Criminal incidents handled by these agencies, however, are not being included in the APD’s 
UCR statistics.  Because there is not an established process for sharing this information, these 
additional crimes are not factored into the overall picture of crime in Atlanta.  Equally as 
important is the fact that full crime patterns happening within the city limits are not being 
identified, delaying apprehension of potentially dangerous criminals. 
 
Audit Conclusions 
Because each section of the audit utilized different samples and different, although statistically 
reliable, techniques to determine if under-reporting and over-reporting occurred, the findings of 
each section are not cumulative and must be considered independent of each other statistically.  
However, because significant underreporting of crime incidence was uncovered in each section, 
the depth of this problem cannot be discounted. 
 
 A review of criminal incident reports for correct crime classification yielded an 
additional 1,570 UCR Part I crimes that were underreported in 2002.  From this 
review alone, UCR crime in Atlanta in 2002 was 3.2 percent higher than was reported 
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 A review of 9-1-1 calls where the responding officer took a report but that report was 
discovered to be “missing” from the system yielded the possibility of another 4,281 
UCR Part I crimes in 2002 not captured by the APD. 
 
 A review of those calls to 9-1-1 where the responding officer indicated to the 
dispatcher that no incident report was warranted, but where callbacks indicated a 
report should have been filed, yielded the possibility of an additional 17,670 UCR 
Part I crimes in 2002 not captured by the APD. 
 
 A review of 9-1-1 calls transferred to Teleserve discovered that hundreds, and 
perhaps thousands, of UCR Part I crimes were not entered into the APD system in 
2002 and, therefore, not included in UCR totals that year. 
 
The combination of these problems – misclassified reports, crime reports simply not entering the 
system, calls to 9-1-1 reporting a crime but where no report was taken, calls being forwarded to 
Teleserve that were not dispatched to officers for investigation – represent collectively a serious 
breakdown in records management that severely handicaps development of effective crime 
strategies and tactics, and the establishment of a benchmark against which to measure crime 
reduction progress and exact accountability.  
 
Post-Auditing Procedures 




 effective June 1, 2004, a new Audit and Compliance Unit was established to conduct 
on-going internal audits of crime reporting and to instruct APD personnel in 
preparation of accurate and timely crime incident reports; 
 
 standard operating procedures were established for the new unit to guide the practices 
of internal quality control checks and audit and coding of incident reports to FBI 
UCR standards; 
 
 training was conducted of Audit and Compliance personnel in internal audits and 
quality control; and 
 
 to ensure continuity in review and to maintain the highest standards of reporting, it 





                                                          
10
 Mayor Shirley Franklin and Chief Richard Pennington, Fragile Momentum: A Plan of Action for Rebuilding the 
Atlanta Police Department to Help Secure Atlanta’s Position as Capital of the New South, February 20, 2004. 
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Audit as Feedback 
As seen, auditing the crime reporting procedures within a police department can provide the 
police chief with an accurate baseline to begin developing effective crime reduction strategies 
that address the real problems.  As Serpas and Morley (2008) point out, “aggressive, thorough, 
and multifaceted data analysis can provide the support chiefs need to show that crime has in fact 
been reduced by law enforcement efforts, or conversely, to ferret out illegal or unethical behavior 
of a department member.”  The question remains then whether or not the audit led to reduced 




Atlanta Crime Rate, 1996-2009 
 
Total Crime Incidents 
Crime Rate 
per 100,00 residents 
1996 70,251 17,001.2 
1997 58,591 13,921.6 
1998 58,129 14,031.9 
1999 55,477 13,488.5 
2000 55,468 13,135.8 
2001 52,195 12,237.7 
2002 49,451 11,355.2 
2003 46,722 10,839.3 
2004 41,107 9,558.3 
2005 38,610 8,965.2 
2006 39,779 8,188.3 
2007 44,307 8,909.7 
2008 46,381 8,701.6 
2009* 40,708 7,362.6 
Source: FBI, Crime in the United States, 1996-2009 
*2009 are preliminary numbers 
 
As table 3 shows, not only did the number of incidents decline (after a brief increase) the 
corresponding crime rate is 57 percent lower than it was in 1996.  This is despite an increase in 
population from 2005 to 2009 of 28 percent due in part to the influx of people fleeing Hurricanes 
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Conclusion 
It would be a mistake to say that the crime declines enjoyed in Atlanta are due entirely to the 
audit of the APD’s crime reporting procedures conducted in 2003.  However, relative to the 
implementation of crime strategies, accurate data gives to the police commanders and executives 
the ability to deploy their limited resources as best they can to reduce crime.  Successful 
implementation of any policy requires that those the formulating the policy have accurate and 
timely information. 
 
Clearly, further studies need to be conducted at a much more sophisticated level to test 
hypotheses as to what led to the sustained decreases in crime.  In addition up-to-date audit results 
need to be examined to ensure that the crime numbers reported post-2003 are indeed accurate.  
Studies of this kind will add to the growing body of literature that policy implementers, in this 
case police officers, actually have a direct impact on the goal of crime policy – making Atlanta 
safe for its residents and visitors alike. 
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